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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
A jury found James Patrick Stell, Jr., guilty of aggravated assault with a deadly
weapon, malicious injury to property, possession of drug paraphernalia, and carrying a
concealed weapon while intoxicated. Mr. Stell asserts two errors on appeal. First, the
district court erred by admitting an irrelevant and prejudicial audio recording of
Mr. Stell’s arrest wherein Mr. Stell invoked his right to counsel following Miranda1
warnings. Second, the district court erred by denying Mr. Stell’s motion for judgment of
acquittal on the charge of carrying a concealed weapon while intoxicated because the
State failed to present sufficient evidence of Mr. Stell’s intoxication. Due to these errors,
this Court should vacate the district court’s judgment of conviction.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
On March 9, 2015, the State filed a Criminal Complaint alleging Mr. Stell
committed the crimes of assault with the intent to commit murder, plus the sentencing
enhancement for the use of a deadly weapon, in violation of I.C. §§ 18-4015 and 19-
2520, and grand theft for a stolen gun, in violation of I.C. §§ 18-2403(4) and -2407(1)(b)
(CR 2015-4640). (R., pp.30–32.) Two misdemeanor citations were issued as well, one
for malicious injury to property, in violation of I.C. § 18-7001(1), and possession of
paraphernalia, in violation of I.C. § 37-3724A, and another for carrying a concealed
weapon while intoxicated, in violation of I.C. § 18-3302B (CR 2015-4591 and CR 2015-
4586, respectively). (R., pp.8, 16.)
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2
Mr. Stell waived a preliminary hearing, and the magistrate bound him over to
district court. (R., pp.39, 40.) The State filed an Information charging Mr. Stell with
assault with the intent to commit murder with a deadly weapon and grand theft.
(R., pp.41–44.) Mr. Stell pled not guilty and proceeded to trial on all three cases.
(R., p.45; see generally Tr. Vols. II, III, IV, V.2) At the start of the trial, the State filed two
Amended Criminal Complaints in lieu of the citations for the misdemeanor offenses.
(Tr. Vol. II, p.4, Ls.6–7, p.10, Ls.8–15; Aug. R., pp.1–4.)
The State’s evidence showed that, on March 6, 2015, Mr. Stell’s girlfriend Lisa
Garcia and Mr. Stell were arguing about “a bunch of stuff” at her house, where Mr. Stell
was staying at the time. (Tr. Vol. IV, p.285, Ls.10–25.) She recalled that they had plans
to do something that afternoon, but Mr. Stell wanted to do something else. (Tr. Vol. IV,
p.286, Ls.22–25.) Mr. Stell walked away, and Ms. Garcia followed him in her car,
begging him to come back home. (Tr. Vol. IV, p.287, L.11–p.290, L.15.) Mr. Stell kept
walking, so Ms. Garcia assumed Mr. Stell was going to the house of their mutual
acquaintances, Arlan Scroggins and Jessica Chavez. (Tr. Vol. IV, p.290, L.9–p.291,
L.10.) Ms. Garcia went to the Old Fort Boise Park to “collect herself” before going back
home. (Tr. Vol. IV, p.290, L.9–p.291, L.10.)
2 There are six transcripts on appeal. The first, cited as Volume I, contains a hearing on
Mr. Stell’s motion to suppress, held on October 21, 2015. The second, cited as Volume
II, contains portions of the first day of trial, including jury selection and opening
statements, held on November 4, 2015. The third, cited as Volume III, contains the
remaining portions of the first day of trial, held on November 4, 2015. The fourth, cited
as Volume IV, contains the second day of trial, held on November 5, 2015. The fifth,
cited as Volume V, contains the third and final day of trial, held on November 6, 2015.
Lastly, the sixth transcript, cited as Volume VI, contains the sentencing hearing, held on
December 29, 2015.
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About three to five minutes later, Mr. Stell arrived at the park in a minivan with
Arlan, who was driving, and Jessica. (Tr. Vol. IV, p.291, Ls.11–p.292, L.5, p.297, Ls.3–
11.) Mr. Stell exited the minivan, and Mr. Stell and Ms. Garcia started arguing again.
(Tr. Vol. IV, p.292, L.6–p.297, L.13.) At some point, Ms. Garcia was pleading with him to
come home for their son’s sake, to which Mr. Stell responded that he did not “give a
fuck about no kids.” (Tr. Vol. IV, p.310, Ls.14–22; see also Tr. Vol. III, p.91, Ls.6–10.)
Mr. Stell refused to come back home and left in the minivan with Arlan and Jessica.
(Tr. Vol. IV, p.295, L.10–p.296, L.19, p.310, Ls.14–22.) Arlan and Jessica took Mr. Stell
back to their home to calm down. (Tr. Vol. IV., p.337, L.25–p.338, L.14, p.374, Ls.9–19.)
Although they were arguing, Ms. Garcia testified that Mr. Stell never made any
threats to her in the park. (Tr. Vol. IV, p.311, L.25–p.312, L.7.) She also testified that
she did not see Mr. Stell with a gun during their argument. (Tr. Vol. IV, p.311, Ls.18–
24.) Arlan acknowledged that Mr. Stell and Ms. Garcia’s argument was “pretty heated,”
but he was not concerned for Ms. Garcia’s safety and did not feel the need to call the
police. (Tr. Vol. IV, p.352, Ls.8–25.)
Around the same time, a woman, Christina Buchanan, called 911 to report an
incident at the park. (Tr. Vol. III, p.88, L.14–p.92, L.15; see also Tr. Vol. III, p.78, L8–
p.87, L.11 (testimony of dispatcher); State’s Ex. 1 (audio of 911 call).) Ms. Buchanan
lived about 100 yards from the park and had sent her kids to play there. (Tr. Vol. III,
p.88, Ls.7–13.) She reported that she had observed a man yelling at an occupant of a
car in the park. (Tr. Vol. III, p.89, L.4–p.91, L.10.) She explained that, eventually, the
man slammed and kicked the passenger door, and the occupant drove off. (Tr. Vol. III,
p.90, Ls.16–20.) As the car drove away, the man pulled out a gun and pointed it at the
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car. (Tr. Vol. III, p.90, Ls.13–21, p.105, L.20–p.106, L.17.) The man “held it there for a
few moments and then put it back down.” (Tr. Vol. III, p.108, L.24–p.109, L.5.) The gun
was never discharged. (Tr. Vol. III, p.109, Ls.9–15.) The man then got into a minivan,
which had been parked right next to the car, and left the park. (Tr. Vol. III, p.89, L.12–
p.92, L.1.) Ms. Buchanan called 911 after she saw the gun. (Tr. Vol. III, p.90, L.22–p.91,
L.3.)
The police, recognizing the minivan from Ms. Buchanan’s 911 call, went to Arlan
and Jessica’s house. (Tr. Vol. III, p.114, L.5–p.116, L.18, p.120, Ls.7–22.) Ms. Garcia
also went to the house to try and reconcile with Mr. Stell. (Tr. Vol. III, p.117, L.11–p.118,
L.15, Vol. IV, p.294, Ls.3–6, p.299, L.19–p.300, L.10.) The police found Mr. Stell leaving
the house through the bathroom window. (Tr. Vol. III, p.123, L.8–p.124, L.18, p.155,
Ls.5–15.) They arrested him. (Tr. Vol. III, p.124, Ls.19–22, p.155, Ls.15–23.) The district
court admitted two audio recordings of Mr. Stell’s arrest. (Tr. Vol. III, p.131, L.2–p.133,
L.17, p.156, L.12–p.157, L.21; State’s Exs. 20, 35.) In one of the recordings, numerous
statements by Mr. Stell can be heard, including a request for counsel. (State’s Ex. 20.)
Inside the bathroom in Arlan and Jessica’s house, the police found a Nike bag
with a gun inside, along with a number of other items, including smoking devices, a
small music speaker, condoms, zip-ties, deodorant, rubber gloves, ammunition, and
duct tape. (Tr. Vol. III, p.125, L.15–p.127, L.19; see also State’s Ex. 9.) One of the
smoking devices testified positive for THC, the active ingredient in marijuana. (Tr. Vol.
IV, p.231, L.14–p.234, L.1, p.236, L.19–p.237, L.23. p.238, Ls.14–17.) The police also
found a 40-ounce bottle of Old English malt liquor. (Tr. Vol. III, p.163, L.25–p.164, L.21.)
The bottle was about three-quarters to two-thirds full. (See State’s Exs. 13–14.) In
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addition, the police found a smashed cell phone, shared by Mr. Stell and Ms. Garcia, in
the road. (Tr. Vol. III, p.164, L.25–p.165, L.14, p.186, Ls.22–25, p.206, L.15–p.207, L.9,
Vol. IV, p.297, L.25–p.299, L.5; see also State’s Exs. 21–23.) Mr. Stell presented no
evidence in his defense. (Tr. Vol. IV, p.414, L.24 (State rests), p.15, Ls.1–2 (defense
rests).)
Just prior to closing arguments, Mr. Stell moved for a judgment of acquittal on the
charges of carrying a concealed weapon while intoxicated, grand theft, and assault.
(Tr. Vol. V, p.19, L.4–p.20, L.16.) The district court denied the motion. (Tr. Vol. V, p.23,
L.25–p.24, L.1.) The jury received an instruction on the lesser-included offense of
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. (Tr. Vol. V, p.11, L.23–p.12, L.5, p.29, L.21–
p.30, L.10; Aug. R., p.49 (Instruction No. 22).) During deliberations, the jury asked the
district court two questions:  (1) “Is any amount of consumption considerd [sic] under the
influence?” and (2) “What constitues [sic] under the influence?” (Aug. R., p.72.) The
district court responded:
There’s no magic formula by which one may evaluate testimony. You
bring with you to this courtroom all of the experience and background of
your lives. In your everyday affairs, you determine for yourselves whom to
believe, what to believe and how much weight to attach to what you were
told. The same considerations that you use in your everyday dealings in
making these decisions are considerations which you should apply in your
deliberations.
(Aug. R., p.73.) Neither party objected to this instruction. (Tr. Vol. V, p.66, L.14–p.68,
L.14.)
The jury found Mr. Stell not guilty of the charge of assault with intent to commit
murder, but guilty of the lesser-included offense of aggravated assault with a deadly
weapon. (R., pp.212–13; Tr. Vol. V, p.69, L.1–p.70, L.6.) The jury also found him not
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guilty of grand theft for the alleged stolen gun. (R., pp.212–13; Tr. Vol. V, p.69, L.1–
p.70, L.6; see also R., p.226 (judgment of acquittal).) The jury found Mr. Stell guilty of
malicious injury to property for the smashed cell phone and possession of drug
paraphernalia. (R., pp.212–13; Tr. Vol. V, p.69, L.1–p.70, L.6.) In addition, they found
him guilty of carrying a concealed weapon while intoxicated. (R., pp.212–13; Tr. Vol. V,
p.69, L.1–p.70, L.6.) Immediately after the verdict, the district court proceeded to Part 2
of the trial regarding whether Mr. Stell used a deadly weapon during the commission of
a crime (the sentencing enhancement). (See generally Tr. Vol. V, p.70, L.10–p.72,
L.14.) The State made a brief argument, and the jury returned a guilty verdict. (Tr. Vol.
V, p.71, Ls.8–13, p.72, Ls.2–14; R., p.214.)
The district court sentenced Mr. Stell to ten years, with five years fixed, for
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. (Tr. Vol. VI, p.10, L.23–p.11, L.3.) The district
court also retained jurisdiction. (Tr. Vol. VI, p.10, L.23–p.11, L.13.) For the misdemeanor
offenses, the district court sentenced him to six months on each offense to be served
concurrently, with six months credit for time served. (Tr. Vol. VI, p.10, Ls.19–22.).




I. Did the district court err when it admitted an audio recording of Mr. Stell’s arrest?
II. Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Stell’s Rule 29 motion for judgment of




The District Court Erred When It Admitted An Audio Recording Of Mr. Stell’s Arrest
A. Introduction
Mr. Stell asserts the district court erred by admitting the State’s Exhibit 20, an
audio recording of his arrest. This recording contains statements by Mr. Stell denying
the charged offenses. These statements were irrelevant and prejudicial because they
went only towards Mr. Stell’s character and credibility. Thus, it was an abuse of
discretion for the district court to admit this exhibit. Moreover, Mr. Stell contends the
prosecutor committed misconduct by offering for admission and publishing to the jury
the portion of the recording in which Mr. Stell invokes his right to counsel. In this
respect, Mr. Stell argues the admission of Exhibit 20 constituted fundamental error.
B. Standard Of Review
“The question of whether evidence is relevant is reviewed de novo, while the
decision to admit relevant evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” State v.
Shutz, 143 Idaho 200, 202 (2006). The Court reviews the district court’s balancing test
of probative value and danger of unfair prejudice for an abuse of discretion. State v.
Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 591 (2013). The Court
determines “whether the district court abused its discretion by examining:
(1) whether the court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
whether the court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and
consistently within the applicable legal standards; and (3) whether the
court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.”
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State v. Parker, 157 Idaho 132, 138 (2014) (quoting State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho
355, 363 (2010)).
If the alleged error is objected-to, the Court applies the harmless error standard:
“Where the defendant meets his initial burden of showing that a violation occurred, the
State then has the burden of demonstrating to the appellate court beyond a reasonable
doubt that the constitutional violation did not contribute to the jury’s verdict.” State v.
Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010). For unobjected-to errors, the Court applies the
fundamental error standard:
Such review includes a three-prong inquiry wherein the defendant bears
the burden of persuading the appellate court that the alleged error: (1)
violates one or more of the defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights; (2)
plainly exists (without the need for any additional information not
contained in the appellate record, including information as to whether the
failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless.
Id. at 228.
C. The Audio Recording Of Mr. Stell’s Arrest Was Irrelevant, Prejudicial, And Thus
Improperly Admitted By The District Court
An admission by a party-opponent is admissible as non-hearsay. Idaho Rule of
Evidence (“I.R.E.”) 801(d)(2). The admission does not have to be “an admission of guilt
or an admission against interest,” but it must be relevant. See State v. Martinez, 128
Idaho 104, 107 (Ct. App. 1995). Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” I.R.E. 401. “Although
relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice . . . .” I.R.E. 403.
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Here, Mr. Stell objected to the admission of Exhibit 20 on the grounds of
relevance and prejudice. (Tr. Vol. III, p.132, Ls.14–15, p.133, Ls.2–7.) In response, the
State argued, “Your Honor, I think it’s relevant because it’s an admission of a party
opponent. The State’s entitled to get in the defendant’s statements about what has
happened. I think this is the best evidence. Not the testimony of the officer. This is the
defendant’s own statements.” (Tr. Vol. III, p.132, Ls.18–23.) The district court admitted
the exhibit over Mr. Stell’s objection, and it was played for the jury. (Tr. Vol. III, p.133,
Ls.8–17.) The recording is approximately four minutes long. (State’s Ex. 20.)
In the recording, the arresting officer informs Mr. Stell “right now, you’re being
charged with aggravated domestic assault with your girlfriend, Lisa.” (State’s Ex. 20,
1:17–1:27.) Mr. Stell denies having a girlfriend and then tells the officer: “Alright, for
every day I spend in jail, I will sue this county. I hope you know that [inaudible]. You
don’t have any proof of anything. And you will lose your job. I didn’t hit nobody. I don’t
know what you’re talking about.” (State’s Ex. 20, 2:25–2:40.) Mr. Stell also tells the
officer, after his Miranda rights, “This isn’t fair. I didn’t do nothing. Because somebody
said some bullshit? C’mon man.” (State’s Ex. 20, 3:03–3:11.)
Mr. Stell asserts his statements were not relevant. “Generally, character
evidence is not permissible to prove a person acted in conformity therewith.” State v.
Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 591 (2013) (citing I.R.E. 404(a)). Mr. Stell’s statements were
nothing more than impermissible character evidence to show Mr. Stell was lying to the
police. His statements do not make any material fact to the charged offenses “more or
less probable.” I.R.E. 401. Certainly, the State was not offering the statements for the
truth of the matter asserted—that Mr. Stell did not commit the charged offenses. The
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U.S. Supreme Court in Miranda recognized a similar concern with “exculpatory”
statements offered by the prosecution:
[N]o distinction may be drawn between inculpatory statements and
statements alleged to be merely “exculpatory.” If a statement made were
in fact truly exculpatory it would, of course, never be used by the
prosecution. In fact, statements merely intended to be exculpatory by the
defendant are often used to impeach his testimony at trial or to
demonstrate untruths in the statement given under interrogation and thus
to prove guilt by implication. These statements are incriminating in any
meaningful sense of the word and may not be used without the full
warnings and effective waiver required for any other statement.
384 U.S. at 477 (emphasis added). Thus, it follows that only purpose for offering
Mr. Stell’s statements was to show his bad character. This was impermissible. Mr. Stell
contends the district court erred by admitting Exhibit 20.
Assuming in arguendo the evidence was relevant, Mr. Stell asserts the district
court abused its discretion because the danger of unfair prejudice substantially
outweighed any probative value to Mr. Stell’s statements. As an initial matter, the district
court did not conduct a Rule 403 balancing test, even though Mr. Stell informed the
district court that Exhibit 20 was “offered primarily to prejudice the jury against my
client.” (Tr. Vol. III, p.133, Ls.3–5.) “By failing to conduct the Rule 403 balancing test,
the district court did not act consistently within the applicable legal standards” and
abused its discretion. Parker, 157 Idaho at 139. Second, the district court did not reach
its decision by an exercise of reason because any probative value was outweighed by
the unfair prejudice to Mr. Stell. The statements showed Mr. Stell acting unfavorably
and disrespecting law enforcement. His statements called into question his credibility
and good character, even though he has the right to remain silent and no obligation to
present a defense. The statements were intended to imply guilt based entirely on the
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assumption Mr. Stell lied to the police. Mr. Stell submits the district court abused its
discretion by admitting Exhibit 20 as it was unfairly prejudicial.
Finally, the State cannot meet its burden to show the admission of Exhibit 20 was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Perry, 150 Idaho at 227. Due to this error, this
Court should vacate the district court’s judgments of conviction and remand these cases
for a new trial.
D. The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct By Presenting Evidence Of Mr. Stell’s
Invocation Of His Right To Counsel To The Jury Through The Audio Recording
The Fifth Amendment, made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment, states in relevant part, “No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself[.]” U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. Similarly, the
Idaho Constitution guarantees that “[n]o person shall . . . be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself[.]” IDAHO CONST.  art.  I,  §  13. See also State v.
Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 60 (2011). “The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted this right
also to bar the prosecution from commenting on a defendant's invocation of that right.”
Ellington, 151 Idaho at 60 (citing Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 613–14 (1965)). “[A]
defendant’s right to remain silent attaches upon custody, not arrest or interrogation, and
thus a prosecutor may not use any post-custody silence to infer guilt in its case-in-
chief.” Id. (citing State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 820–21 (1998)); see also State v.
Skunkcap, 157 Idaho 221, 234 (2014) (“It is clearly erroneous for a prosecutor to
introduce evidence of the defendant’s postarrest silence for the purpose of raising an
inference of guilt.” (quoting State v. Hodges, 105 Idaho 588, 591 (1983)). “[T]he
constitutional right against self-incrimination is not absolute . . . and applies only when
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the silence is used solely for the purpose of implying guilt.” Ellington, 151 Idaho at 61
(quoting Moore, 131 Idaho at 821).
Similar to post-custody silence, a prosecutor may not use a defendant’s post-
custody request for counsel as substantive evidence of guilt. See State v. Parton, 154
Idaho 558, 567 (2013). Post-custody silence and requests for counsel are analyzed in
the same manner because the invocation of the right to counsel is equivalent to the
invocation of the right to remain silent—the police must stop all questioning until an
attorney is present. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–85 (1981); Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473–74 (1966); see also Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284,
295 n.13 (1986) (“With respect to post-Miranda warnings ‘silence,’ we point out that
silence does not mean only muteness; it includes the statement of a desire to remain
silent as well as of a desire to remain silent until an attorney has been consulted.”).
Thus, a prosecutor’s comment on a defendant’s invocation of his right to counsel also
constitutes misconduct. See Parton, 154  Idaho at  567–68.  Even if  a  prosecutor  elicits
unsolicited testimony that comments on the defendant’s invocation of his rights, the
unsolicited testimony is imputed to the State. Parker, 157 Idaho at 147; Ellington, 151
Idaho at 61.
Here, Mr. Stell contends the prosecutor committed misconduct by presenting to
the jury the portion of State’s Exhibit 20 in which Mr. Stell invokes his right to counsel.
Mr. Stell did not object to the admission of Exhibit 20 on this basis, so he must
demonstrate fundamental error. (See Tr. Vol. III, p.132, L.11–p.133, L.17.) He asserts
his unwaived constitutional rights to remain silent and a fair trial were violated by the
admission of this portion of the exhibit.
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Near the end of the recording, the following exchange takes place between the
arresting officer and Mr. Stell:
Police Officer: I’m going to advise you of your rights. First off, you have the
right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will be used against you in
a court of law. You have a right to an attorney. And he can be present
while you’re questioned.
Mr. Stell: I would like him right now.
Police Officer: If you can’t afford ---
Mr. Stell: I would like him here right now.
Police Officer: Let me finish my statement, okay?
Mr. Stell: I would like my attorney right now.
Police Officer: If you can’t --
Mr. Stell: This isn’t fair. I didn’t do nothing. Because somebody said some
bullshit? C’mon man.
Police Officer: Anyways, if you can’t afford an attorney, you can have one
potentially paid for by the State. Any questions about that? You
understand your rights?
Mr. Stell: Yes, sir.
Police Officer: You have any questions about that?
Mr. Stell: No, sir.
Police Officer: Okay. So, you don’t want to tell me then what happened,
huh?
(State’s Ex. 20, 2:40–3:34 (emphasis added)). This part of the recording unambiguously
informed the jury of Mr. Stell’s invocation of his right to counsel. Mr. Stell asserts the
prosecutor committed misconduct by offering and publishing this portion of the audio
recording, in violation of Mr. Stell’s unwaived constitutional rights to silence and due
process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, as well as
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Article 1, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 227 (“Where a
prosecutor attempts to secure a verdict on any factor other than the law as set forth in
the jury instructions and the evidence admitted during trial, including reasonable
inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, this impacts a defendant’s Fourteenth
Amendment right to a fair trial.”).
Next, this error is clear from the record. The prosecutor’s presentation of
evidence to the jury on the defendant’s invocation of his Fifth Amendment right is plainly
impermissible under well-established United States and Idaho precedent. See, e.g.,
Griffin, 380 U.S. at 613–14; Parker, 157 Idaho at 146–47; Ellington, 151 Idaho at 59–61;
State v. Strouse, 133 Idaho 709, 713–14 (1999); State v. Lopez, 141 Idaho 575, 577–79
(Ct. App. 2005); State v. Tucker, 138 Idaho 296, 298–99 (Ct. App. 2003). There is no
conceivable strategic or tactical reason why defense counsel would chose not to object
to such evidence. This evidence asks the jury to infer guilt from the defendant’s exercise
of his constitutional rights. Mr. Stell has met his burden to show the error plainly exists.
Finally, this error was not harmless. Mr. Stell’s request for an attorney signals a
guilty conscious. It informs the jury Mr. Stell must have done something unlawful in
order to necessitate his immediate request for counsel. Yet, the State’s evidence
against Mr. Stell for two of the charged offenses was wholly inadequate—the jury
acquitted Mr. Stell of grand theft and the greater offense of assault with intent to commit
murder. Further, the evidence for the lesser-included offense of aggravated assault was
tenuous. The alleged victim, Ms. Garcia, testified that she was never threatened by
Mr. Stell and never saw a gun. Jessica and Arlan gave inconsistent testimony.
Mr. Stell’s request for an attorney, however, indicates guilt. In light of the evidence
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presented in this case and the prejudicial statements in the audio recording, Mr. Stell
submits he has met his burden to show there is a reasonable possibility the admission
of Exhibit 20 affected the outcome of the trial. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226.
II.
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Stell’s Rule 29 Motion For Judgment Of
Acquittal For Carrying A Concealed Weapon While Intoxicated
A. Introduction
Mr. Stell submits the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support the
jury’s verdict for carrying a concealed weapon while intoxicated. Specifically, no rational
trier of fact could have found the essential element of intoxication. Because the State
failed to show Mr. Stell was intoxicated or under the influence of drugs or alcohol, the
district court should have granted Mr. Stell’s motion for judgment of acquittal on this
offense.
B. Standard Of Review
When reviewing the district court’s denial of a Rule 29 motion, this Court asks
whether, “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.” State v. Eliasen, 158 Idaho 542, 546 (2015) (quoting Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 460 (2012)).
“Evidence is substantial if a reasonable trier of fact would accept it and rely upon it in
determining whether a disputed point of fact has been proven.” Id. (citing State v.
Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 712 (2009)). The Court freely reviews questions of law but
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will not substitute its “judgment for that of the jury on issues of witness credibility, weight
of the evidence, or reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.” Id. (citing
Adamcik, 152 Idaho at 460).
C. The State Failed To Present Sufficient Evidence To Prove Beyond A Reasonable
Doubt Mr. Stell Was Intoxicated Or Under The Influence Of Alcohol Or Drugs
Idaho Criminal Rule 29(a) requires that the trial court “shall order the entry of
judgment of acquittal” on any charged offense if, “after the evidence on either side is
closed . . . the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense . . . .”
I.C.R. 29(a).
That is because the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution guarantees the right to due process, and the U.S. Supreme
Court has held that as a part of that due process, “no person shall be
made to suffer the onus of a criminal conviction except upon sufficient
proof—defined as evidence necessary to convince a trier of fact beyond a
reasonable doubt of the existence of every element of the offense.”
Eliasen, 158 Idaho at 545 (quoting State v. Goggin, 157 Idaho 1, 5 (2014)). The State
has the burden to prove the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable
doubt. Id. at 546.
Idaho Code section 18-3302B provides:  “It shall be unlawful for any person to
carry a concealed weapon on or about his person when intoxicated or under the
influence of an intoxicating drink or drug.” I.C. § 18-3302B. Under the terms of the
statute, the State must prove not only that the defendant carried a concealed weapon,
but also that he was intoxicated or under the influence of drugs or alcohol at the time of
the concealed carry. Here, Mr. Stell does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence
for carrying a concealed weapon. (Tr. Vol. V, p.19, Ls.5–7.) He contends, however, the
evidence was insufficient to show he was intoxicated or under the influence.
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Idaho Code § 18-3302B provides no definition for “intoxicated” or “under the
influence.” Statutory interpretation, reviewed de novo, begins with the statute's plain
language. State v. Owens, 158 Idaho 1, 3 (2015). The Court “considers the statute as a
whole, and gives words their plain, usual, and ordinary meanings.” Id. Here, the plain
meaning of the terms “intoxication” and “under the influence” demonstrates that more
than the mere consumption of alcohol or drugs is required to satisfy the statute. Black’s
Law Dictionary defines intoxication as: “A diminished ability to act with full mental and
physical capabilities because of alcohol or drug consumption; drunkenness.” BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY, Westlaw (10th ed. 2014). Likewise, Merriam-Webster defines
intoxication as: “the condition of having physical or mental control markedly diminished
by the effects of alcohol or drugs.” Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/intoxication (last visited March 14, 2017). “Under the influence”
is defined as: “(Of a driver, pilot, etc.) deprived of clearness of mind and self-control
because of drugs or alcohol” by Black’s Law Dictionary and “affected by alcohol or drug
intoxication” by Merriam-Webster. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, Westlaw (10th ed. 2014);
Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/under the influence (last
visited March 14, 2017). These definitions support an interpretation of “intoxication” or
“under the influence” that requires some impact or effect on the defendant’s mental and
physical state due to the alcohol or drugs. Mere consumption is not enough; the
consumption of alcohol or drugs must affect the defendant’s body and mind.
This interpretation is in line with the Court’s definition of intoxication for the
offense of driving under the influence, the most analogous statute to the one at issue
here. I.C. § 18-8004(1)(a) provides:
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It is unlawful for any person who is under the influence of alcohol, drugs or
any other intoxicating substances, or any combination of alcohol, drugs
and/or any other intoxicating substances, or who has an alcohol
concentration of 0.08, as defined in subsection (4) of this section, or more,
as shown by analysis of his blood, urine, or breath, to drive or be in actual
physical control of a motor vehicle within this state, whether upon a
highway, street or bridge, or upon public or private property open to the
public.
I.C. § 18-8004(1)(a) (emphasis added). “This section has been interpreted as
establishing one crime with two ways of proving a violation.” State v. Robinett, 141
Idaho 110, 112 (2005). One way is to “establish the defendant drove with an alcohol
concentration of 0.08 percent or more,” also known as the per se theory. Id. The other
way is “to show under the totality of the evidence that the defendant was driving under
the influence,” also known as the impairment theory. Id. “In order to be ‘under the
influence,’ a person need only have consumed sufficient alcohol and drugs or other
intoxicating substances ‘to such extent as to influence or affect his driving of the motor
vehicle.’” State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 724 (2007) (quoting State v. Glanzman, 69
Idaho 46, 49 (1949)). “[T]he impairment method of proof considers the totality of the
evidence, meaning ‘circumstantial evidence of impaired driving ability or other
observable symptoms of intoxication.’” Robinett, 141 Idaho at 112 (quoting State v.
Barker, 123 Idaho 162, 163 (Ct. App. 1992)). The Court’s definition of the impairment
theory—to have consumed sufficient alcohol, drugs, other intoxicating substances to
such extent as to influence or affect driving—is useful to the interpretation of
“intoxication” and “under the influence” for carrying a concealed weapon.
Here, regarding Mr. Stell’s consumption of alcohol, the State presented the
testimony of two police officers who interacted with Mr. Stell during his arrest and the
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testimony of Arlan and Jessica.3 The State also presented two photographs of the 40-
ounce bottle of Old English Malt Liquor. (State’s Exs. 13–14.) This evidence was
insufficient to show Mr. Stell consumed sufficient alcohol to affect or impact his physical
and mental state.
Arlan and Jessica both testified that Mr. Stell was agitated when he initially
showed up at their house. (Tr. Vol. IV, p.327, L.24–p.328, L.18.) Jessica testified that
Mr. Steel “seemed agitated because [he and Ms. Garcia] were fighting but he wasn’t . . .
acting overly aggressive.” (Tr. Vol. IV, p.369, Ls.15–19.) She testified that Mr. Stell did
not seem “intoxicated or anything to me” when he initially came over to their house.
(Tr. Vol. IV, p.369, Ls.20–23.) Arlan thought Mr. Stell might have had some alcohol
before he came to their house based solely on his behavior, but he clarified that he did
not smell any alcohol on Mr. Stell’s breath or see any alcohol on him. (Tr. Vol. IV, p.328,
Ls.10–18, p.349, L.19–p.350, L.9.) Arlan and Jessica then took Mr. Stell to a Jackson’s
convenience store where he purchased the bottle of malt liquor. (Tr. Vol. IV, p.328,
L.21–p.330, L.5, p.350, Ls.10–15, p.370, Ls.2–13.) The incident in the park with
Ms. Garcia occurred on their way home from Jackson’s. (See Tr. Vol. IV, p.351, Ls.1–7,
p.370, Ls.10–13.) According to Arlan, Mr. Stell did not drink the malt liquor until after
they were back at Arlan and Jessica’s house. (Tr. Vol. IV, p.330, Ls.3–14, p.331, L.21–
p.332, L.2.) Arlan also testified, however, that Mr. Stell might have been sipping on the
malt liquor in the minivan after the incident in the park. (Tr. Vol. IV, p.350, Ls.16–19,
p.358, Ls.1–3.).) Jessica testified that, once they arrived back home, Mr. Stell had
3 There was no testimony from Ms. Garcia regarding Mr. Stell being intoxicated or under
the influence or even consuming alcohol before, during, or after their argument in the
park. (See generally Tr. Vol. IV, p.279, L.10–p.317, L.23 (Ms. Garcia’s testimony).)
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“barely cracked the bottle,” and she recognized that “the alcohol didn’t seem to affect
him much.” (Tr. Vol. IV, p.390, Ls.2–21.)
During  Mr.  Stell’s  arrest,  one  officer  testified  that  Mr.  Stell  was  “semi-agitated”
and he “could smell the odor of alcohol.” (Tr. Vol. III, p.125, Ls.1–4.) The officer
recognized that Mr. Stell’s agitation was not necessarily a sign of intoxication, but also
could be due to the police’s investigation and his subsequent arrest. (Tr. Vol. III, p.141,
Ls.3–9.) The officer also testified that he did not recall seeing Mr. Stell “overly
intoxicated.” (Tr. Vol. III, p.128, Ls.2–10.) Similarly, the officer testified that he “could tell
that he’d been drinking,” but he could not say “for sure” that Mr. Stell was impaired by
alcohol. (Tr. Vol. III, p.142, L.7–p.143, L.4.) Further, the officer testified that he arrested
Mr. Stell for carrying a concealed weapon while intoxicated “for the mere fact he’d been
consuming alcohol and wielding a firearm,” based on Mr. Stell’s demeanor and odor of
alcohol. (Tr. Vol. III, p.145, Ls.3–10.) The officer recognized that it was “possible” that
Mr. Stell consumed the alcohol after the incident in the park. (Tr. Vol. III, p.148, Ls.8–
10.) A second officer testified that he smelled the odor of alcohol on Mr. Stell. (Tr. Vol.
III, p.159, Ls.5–8.) No field sobriety, breath, or blood tests were done to determine
Mr. Stell’s level of intoxication, if any. (Tr. Vol. III, p.141, L.16–p.142, L.6, p.146, Ls.7–
10.)
Considering all the evidence, the State failed to meet its burden to show
Mr. Stell’s mere consumption of alcohol caused him to be intoxicated or under the
influence when he was carrying the gun. There was no testimony from Arlan and
Jessica that Mr. Stell was acting in a manner to indicate intoxication or impairment due
to his consumption of alcohol. Their testimony showed Mr. Stell started drinking the malt
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liquor most likely after, but possibly before, his argument with Ms. Garcia. Regardless of
when Mr. Stell started to drink the malt liquor, it is undisputed that Mr. Stell was not
“knocking back the beer” and had “barely cracked the bottle.” (Tr. Vol. IV, p.350, Ls.16–
19, p.390, Ls.14–18.) This is evident from the two photographs of the 40-ounce bottle
showing only one-quarter to one-third of the malt liquor gone. (State’s Exs. 13–14.)
Turning to the police’s testimony, their only indication Mr. Stell had consumed alcohol
was the odor. There was no evidence Mr. Stell displayed any signs of impairment, such
as bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, or difficulty walking. In fact, the arresting officer
could not say “for sure” Mr. Stell was impaired by alcohol. Thus, looking at the totality of
the circumstances, the evidence presented by the State does not satisfy any possible
definition for intoxication or under the influence. At best, the evidence showed Mr. Stell
consumed a small amount of malt liquor sometime during the afternoon of March 6.
There was no evidence Mr. Stell was intoxicated or under the influence of that alcohol
when he was carrying the concealed weapon.
Finally, the evidence was equally insufficient for intoxication due to the ingestion
of controlled substances. The evidence showed three pipes used for smoking marijuana
were found in the Nike backpack. (Tr. Vol. III, p.126, Ls.11–13, p.184, Ls.9–15, p.186,
Ls.7–10.) One of the pipes tested positive for THC. (Tr. Vol. IV, p.231, L.14–p.234, L.1,
p.236, L.19–p.237, L.23. p.238, Ls.14–17.) There was no other pertinent evidence on
the smoking devices. Mere possession of marijuana paraphernalia is insufficient to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt Mr. Stell’s intoxication or influence of marijuana at the
time of the concealed weapon carry.
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Because there was not substantial and competent evidence on the intoxication
element, the district court erroneously denied Mr. Stell’s motion for a judgment of
acquittal on the offense of carrying a concealed weapon while intoxicated.
CONCLUSION
For the charge of carrying a concealed weapon while intoxicated, Mr. Stell
respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and remand this
case to the district court with instructions to enter a judgment of acquittal for the offense.
Due to the evidentiary error in admitting Exhibit 20, Mr. Stell respectfully requests that
this Court vacate the district court’s judgments of conviction and remand these cases for
a new trial.
DATED this 14th day of March, 2017.
__________/s/_______________
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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